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Abstract
In Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) the authors develop a model in which
di¤erences in the liquidity of distinct assets create a link between asset
prices and macroeconomic aggregates. Their goal is to build a work-
horse model that incorporates liquidity as the cause for the circulation
of money, in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) environ-
ment, close enough to the real business cycle (RBC) framework, and thus,
suitable for studying monetary policy. In this article, I am interested in
studying how this framework can be used to understand the e¤ects of
liquidity and technology shocks in the U.S. economy. I calibrate their
model and study the impact of adding up liquidity constraints on its
RBC performance. I nd that liquidity constraints have a remarkable
impact on the volatility of investment and consumption. Moreover, I
conclude that, in this context, asset pricesvolatility is explained as a
natural feature of a monetary economy when hit by liquidity shocks.
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1 Introduction:
In Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) - henceforth, KM - the authors develop a model
in which di¤erences in the liquidity of distinct assets create a link between
asset prices and macroeconomic aggregates. Their ultimate goal is to build
a workhorse model that incorporates liquidity as the central cause for the
existence of money, in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
environment, close enough to the Real Business Cycle (RBC) framework, and
thus, suitable for studying monetary policy.
KM di¤ers from the usual monetary models in the sense that money is
neither dened in a reduced-form way, as conventionally done in Cash-in-
Advance and Money-in-Utility models, nor assumed to result from a search
environment, as in the prevailing matching models1. The problem with the
rst type of models, is that they impose the usage of money rather than explain
the causes that justify its circulation. This is not the case with matching
models, in which money arises endogenously. However, this type of models is
usually not suitable for doing monetary policy, given that tractability is often
lost when too rigid assumptions are relaxed2.
In KM instead, money circulation is not imposed (meaning that money,
as an asset, plays no particularly di¤erent role in the economy) and markets
are competitive. However, in this model the economy is subject to liquidity
constraints, which ultimately dene whether money is used or not.
In the model of KM there are two types of agents - workers and entre-
preneurs. Two types of assets are transacted: money (in xed supply) and
capital or equity claims of capital (which supply depends on investment and
depreciation). While workers play a passive role in this economy, either con-
1See Lucas and Stokey (1987) and Christiano et al.(1997) for examples of Cash-in-Advance
models. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Kocherlakota (1998) illustrate the nature of match-
ing models.
2Lagos and Wright (2005), Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2009) and Huang and Wright
(2008) are good examples of attempts to overcome this problem.
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suming or saving their income (in the form of money or equity), entrepreneurs
have access to a production technology and are subject to an iid investment
opportunity shock. The fraction of entrepreneurs hit by the shock, have the
opportunity to invest in a technology that transforms one unit of output in
t into one unit of capital in t + 1. Given that, only a percentage of entre-
preneurs face these investment opportunities, there is a need for transferring
resources from those who do not have been hit by the shock (savers), to those
who have (investors). In practice, investors sell equity claims on the output
return, resulting from the newly produced capital, at market price qt, in or-
der to nance their investment. Crucially, investors are needed to employ
the newly produced capital and provide the return on equity to its creditors.
However, they are not necessarily able to commit to do so. Hence, this limited
commitment constraint implies that investors can only pledge a given fraction
 2 (0; 1) of the newly issued capital. This constitutes a borrowing constraint,
in the sense that investors cannot completely leverage the investment oppor-
tunity. In other words, funds are not fully transferred from savers to investors
and these face the need to nance the investment with their own funds. At
this point, liquidity plays its decisive role: in fact, while money holdings are
fully convertible into output goods at market price pt, equity (either in the
form of own capital stock or equity claims on others capital stock) is only
convertible into output goods up to a fraction 't 2 (0; 1), at market price qt,
each period.
Whether money plays a role in this economy is dened by how stringent
 and 't are. The reason for this lies on the fact that entrepreneurs face a
trade-o¤ between holding money and equity: money pays a low return but
is completely liquid, whereas equity pays a high return but is only partially
liquid. If  and 't are su¢ ciently low, money circulates and plays the role of
providing liquidity to investors. However, if the liquidity constraints are not
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signicant ( and 't are close enough to one), then the economy is su¢ ciently
liquid and there is no need to hold the lowest return asset (money). Hence,
in this context money serves the sole purpose of lubricating the economy. If
such purpose is not needed (the economy is already su¢ ciently lubricated)
then money circulation is ruled out. Instead, if liquidity is scarce, money
arises endogenously to lubricate the economy and facilitate the ow of funds
between savers and investors.
Notice that, even though the authors successfully endogenize money, they
do so by creating a reduced-form structure for the liquidity constraints present
in the model. In fact, the resaleability constraint 't - similarly to the cash-
in-advance constraint or the money-in-utility formulation - lacks structural
robustness. More concretely, note that 't is dened as a Markov stochas-
tic process, so that shocks to the resaleability of equity are present in the
model. This is an approach to track the sudden liquidity shortage that has
characterized the recent nancial turmoil, but we can see right away that it
is a poor one. In reality, the formulation of 't, as dened in KM, stipulates
that the rst fraction of old equity holdings is sold at no cost, whereas from
the ('t)
th fraction onwards, the investor bears an innite transaction cost of
selling equity. Clearly this is an unreasonable cost structure, which lacks mi-
croeconomic fundament3. It is, however, beyond the scope of KM to justify
the microeconomic foundations of 't, instead it focuses on understanding the
e¤ects of liquidity shocks.
Notwithstanding the above, this innovative specication of money and liq-
uidity in a DSGE framework, not only successfully justies seemingly para-
doxical macroeconomic facts, as natural features of a monetary economy that
is subject to liquidity shocks, but also allows for the performance of monetary
3This precise fact is referred by John Moore in Claredon Lectures 2 - Liquidity, business
cycles and monetary policy (2001). Kiyotaki and Moore (2005) studies in detail an adverse
selection justication for 't.
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policy in a tractable environment4.
The RBC literature is nowadays particularly interested in exploring the
capacity of state-of-art models, to produce real business cycle statistics that
are in line with the ones observed in the data. The better their performance,
the more condent one can be when using these models for monetary policy
analysis. New-keynesian models like the ones presented in Christiano, Martin
Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans (2005) or in Frank Smets and Raf Wouters
(2007), are equipped to produce time series that can remarkably mimic the
data. In fact, these models are so e¤ective in tting the data that, as I
write this article, the European Central Bank is using a version of Smets and
Wouters (2007) to inform its monetary policies. Nonetheless, it is not consen-
sual among macroeconomists whether we should support or disencourage the
usage of New-keynesian models for monetary policy purposes. In fact, a great
number of economists ercely believe that New-keynesian models are not yet
useful for policy analysis, as defended by V.V. Chari, Patrick J. Kehoe and
Ellen R. McGrattan (2008). The main critique being faced by New-keynesian
economists is that they include too many dubiously structural parameters and
reduced-form shocks, that are manifestly inconsistent with microeconomic ev-
idence. Neoclassical economists, instead, refuse to include such short-cuts in
their models, for the sole purpose of improving their RBC performance, on
the grounds that these constitute a severe incongruence with the data, which
cannot be ignored when doing policy analysis. From a Neoclassical perspec-
tive, as long as this incongruence prevails, New-keynesian models should not
be considered reliable for policy analysis, and thus should not be used by
central authorities to quantitatively inform their policy-making. Until then,
qualitative rules-of-thumb should instead be used.
The model proposed by KM is, in its essence, a congregation of di¤er-
4These paradoxes include the low risk-free rate, the low rate of participation in asset
markets and the excess volatility of asset prices.
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ent streams of thought and economic theories. Its structural core is a basic
Neoclassical model, perfectly competitive and absent of nominal frictions. In
this sense this model, avoids the usual criticisms faced by New-keynesian pro-
ponents, in what concerns the proigacy of dubiously structural shocks and
reduced-form structures that are poorly microfounded5. In fact, the model
of KM includes only one typically New-keynesian reduced-form shock - the
liquidity shock 't - as a short-cut for modelling the resaleability constraint
presented in Kiyotaki and Moore (2005). As for the investment decision, it
embodies the Tobins q theory, to the extent that investors have an incentive
to invest as long as the market price of equity is higher than its cost (qt > 1).
Finally, this model proposes an innovative way of including money in a DSGE
framework, one that focus on the role of money in lubricating the economy,
as the sole cause for its circulation.
Considering the above, despite the reduced-form structure for 't, the
model of KM is essentially a Neoclassical model, with an original modelling of
money and liquidity. My goal is to study to what extent it can contribute to
the RBC literature. More concretely, my ambition is to discernibly understand
how does each feature of the model in KM contribute to changing the RBC
performance of a standard Neoclassical model. In order to do so, I simulate
a sequence of models that are simpler versions of KM, calibrated for the U.S.
economy. In practice, I start by simulating the simplest version of the model
in KM: a standard Neoclassical model, very close to the one presented in King
and Rebelo (1999) - also referred to as KR in what follows. Then, I proceed
step-by-step, adding up new features to this basic framework, at each step an-
alyzing the RBC performance of the model, until I end up with the economy
of KM. My goal is to scrutinize the impact of each new ingredient added, on
the RBC behavior of the model. As we shall see, liquidity constraints have a
5Check Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) for a critical view of how suitable New-
keynesian models are to do policy analysis.
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remarkable impact on the ability of this model to t the RBC statistics ob-
served for the U.S. economy. In particular, I show that liquidity constraints
have a very strong impact on the volatility of investment and consumption,
not so much directly, through their impact on the entrepreneurs behavior,
but rather indirectly, for the simple fact that they disencourage workers from
participating in the asset market. Moreover, the model of KM justies the
paradox of asset pricesvolatility as natural feature of a monetary economy
that is hit by liquidity shocks 't.
The structure of the rest of this article is the following: in Section 2 I
present, in a summarized way, the model of KM; Section 3 exposes the above
referred Neoclassical de-construction of KM, together with the simulation re-
sults of each simplied model; in Section 4 I explain in detail the calibration
procedure for the original KM model; Sections 5 and 6 include a detailed study
of the shock dynamics in KM and the simulation results for the original KM
model; nally in Section 7 I present some concluding remarks.
2 The Model:
In the model of KM there are two types of agents - workers and entrepreneurs
- with distinct preferences, although they share the same rate of time prefer-
ence. Entrepreneurs are subject to investment opportunities that allow them
to produce new capital out of consumption goods. Investment opportunities
are independent and identically distributed across entrepreneurs and have a
constant arrival rate  2 (0; 1). Therefore, at each point in time there exists
a fraction  of entrepreneurs who have an investment opportunity (investors)
and a fraction 1    who do not (savers). Workers, instead play a passive
role in this economy. They cannot invest as they are assumed not to face
investment opportunities. Hence, they work and either save or consume their
income.
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There are three types of assets traded, namely a non-durable consumption
good (output) Y , equity N and money M . Money is di¤erent from equity in
the sense that it is completely liquid, meaning that it can be transformed into
consumption goods at price pt with no restrictions (notice that pt is hereby
dened as the inverse of the usual price level). On the contrary, equity is the
illiquid asset in this environment, in the sense that it can only be partially
transformed into consumption goods at price qt. The aggregate amount of
money in this economy is set xed at some quantity M .
I proceed by describing this model for each type of agent.
2.1 Workers:
There is a unit measure of workers each with present value utility, at date t,
given by:
E0
1X
t=0
tU

cwt  
!
1 + 
(lwt )
1+

(1)
where cwt is the consumption level of a typical worker in period t and l
w
t is his
labour supply in hours. Assume that U [:] is increasing and strictly concave.
Workers do not have investment opportunities, which means that their income
relies on the return from their savings and on the wage they get for each hour
worked. Money pays no return, whereas equity provides gross prot rate rt
and depreciates at rate 1    with  2 (0; 1). Hence the ow of funds of a
worker can be described as:
cwt + qt
 
nwt+1   nwt

+ pt
 
mwt+1  mwt

= wtl
w
t + rtn
w
t (2)
where mwt and n
w
t are holdings of money and equity respectively and wt is the
real wage rate.
The rst order conditions of workers include:
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lwt =
wt
!
 1

(3)
This is obtained by equating the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure to the real wage.
Given that there exists a unit measure of workers, the resulting aggregate
labour supply is given by:
Lwt =
wt
!
 1

(4)
Later it will be proved that, in a neighborhood of the steady state, workers
decide not to save in any kind of asset and thus set their consumption equal
to their entire labour income. From this point onwards I assume this is the
case:
Claim 1: In a neighborhood of the steady state, workers decide not to save
any of their income, thus consuming all earnings resulting from the hours
worked.
cwt = wtl
w
t
2.2 Entrepreneurs:
As with workers, there is a unit measure of entrepreneurs with preferences
given by:
E0
1X
t=0
t log (ct) (5)
Each entrepreneur has access to a constant returns to scale (CRS) tech-
nology that produces consumption goods out of capital and labour inputs,
according to a Cobb-Douglas:
yt = At(kt)
(lt)
1  ; (6)
where kt and lt are respectively the capital and labour used for production.
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The capital share of output is denoted by  2 (0; 1). The output produced by
entrepreneurs can both be consumed or saved in either equity or money.
Entrepreneurs employ workers in a perfectly competitive labour market,
which means that one can dene the gross prot rate rt as the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital:
yt   wtlt = rtkt (7)
Given kt, entrepreneurs maximize their gross prot net of labour costs
At (kt)
 (lt)
1  wtlt with respect to lt. This gives rise to the aggregate labour
demand:
Lt = Kt

(1  )At
wt
 1

(8)
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock. The labour market clearing condition
is the one that equates Lt to Lwt , from (4) and (8). This implies that the
equilibrium real wage rate is:
wt =

Kt [(1  )At]
1
 !
1

 
+

(9)
Once we substitute the equilibrium wage rate above into the expression of
the gross prot net of labor costs At (Kt)
 (Lt)
1    wtLt, we can dene this
to be equal to rtKt where rt is:
rt = at (Kt)
 1 (10)
where:
at= 

1  
!
 1 
+
(At)
1+
+ ;
= 

1 + 
 + 

; (11)
The gross prot rate rt is the marginal productivity of capital. Therefore
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it decreases with Kt. Note however that aggregate output, net of labour costs,
Yt = rtKt = at (Kt)
 is an increasing function of the capital stock. I is also
worth emphasizing that, although on the individual level entrepreneurs have
access to a constant returns to scale technology, on aggregate, this economy has
a decreasing returns to scale production technology. As for the productivity
shock At it has a positive impact on rt through at.
As previously referred, investment opportunities appear to entrepreneurs
with an arrival rate  2 (0; 1). These allow them to transform one unit of
output in period t into one unit of capital in period t + 1. Entrepreneurs
nance investment by issuing equity claims on the output produced using the
new capital. They sell these claims for qt units of output and pay one unit of
output for each claim. Hence, entrepreneurs decide to invest as long as qt > 1.
Conversely, if qt < 1 they prefer not to invest, whereas if qt = 1 entrepreneurs
are indi¤erent between investing and consuming. In this sense, this model
embodies the Tobins q theory of investment.
The equity claims pay rt+1 units of output at t+ 1, rt+2 at t+ 2, 2rt+3
at t + 3 and so on, for each unit of investment. Investors are not necessarily
able to commit to provide these returns on equity to creditors. Due to this
limited commitment constraint, investors are only able to pledge a certain
proportion of their investment. This is called the Borrowing Constraint and
formally states that, investors can only pledge a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the
newly issued equity it. Since the price of the newly issued equity is qt, they
are able to borrow qt per unit of investment, which means that for each unit
of investment, the downpayment required is 1  qt.
Investors need to use their own funds to nance the downpayment. They
can use the money they hold at zero cost. However, they are only able to
resell a fraction 't 2 (0; 1), of their old equity holdings (where 't is a random
variable). This is called the Resaleability Constraint and constitutes the source
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of liquidity shocks in this economy.
Notice that, since the own capital stock and equity from other entrepre-
neurs pay the same return, these assets are perfect substitutes and thus all
types of equity can be treated as a single asset. In general an entrepreneur
has the following balance sheet:
Balance Sheet at the end of period t
money: ptmt+1 own equity issued: qtnit+1
equity of others: qtnot+1
own capital stock: qtkt+1 Net worth
The net equity of an entrepreneur is:
nt+1 = n
o
t+1 + kt+1   nit+1
At this point the liquidity constraint can be formally written in terms of
equity holdings nt and investment it:
nt+1 > (1  ) it + (1  't)nt (12)
An entrepreneur who invests it units of output, can only pledge up to a
fraction  of her newly issued equity and resell a fraction 't of her old equity
holdings nt. Therefore, an amount (1  ) it of unpledgeable new equity and
a quantity (1  't)nt of old equity holdings necessarily remain within her
balance-sheet.
In addition, money cannot be held short:
mt+1 > 0 (13)
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The accumulation equation for capital is:
kt+1 = it + kt (14)
Next, I proceed by analyzing the behavior of investors and savers sepa-
rately.
2.2.1 Investors
Consider the problem of an entrepreneur who faces an investment opportunity.
Her ow of funds is given by:
cit + it + qt
 
nit+1   it   nt

+ pt
 
mit+1  mt

= rtnt (15)
where I use the superscript i to designate the investorsvariables. The LHS
of (15) includes expenditures in consumption, investment and net purchases
of equity and money and the RHS includes the investors income net of labour
costs.
Hereafter, in line with KM, I assume that the following claim holds:
Claim 2: Consider the following assumption:
Assumption 1 :
 (; 't) = 
2 (1  ) (1  ') [(1  ) (1  )  (1  )    ']
+ [(   ) (1  )  (1  )    '] [1  +   (1  )    ']
 [ (1  ) (1  ) + (1  )  +  ( +    )'] > 0
and assume that it holds. Then, in the neighborhood of the steady state, one
can ascertain that:
 Capital is priced above cost (qt > 1);
 Money has strictly positive value (pt > 0);
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 Investors want to sell all their money holdings
 
mit+1 = 0

6.
This equilibrium is called a Monetary Economy, in the sense that money
has strictly positive value pt > 0. Under the conditions of Claim 2 both
liquidity constraints are binding. Given that qt > 1, investors want to liquidate
as much asset holdings as they possibly can. This means that we can substitute
for it, from (12) holding with equality, in the ow of funds of investors, (15),
and obtain:
cit + q
R
t n
i
t+1 =

rt +

qRt (1  't) + qt't


	
nt + ptmt (16)
where qRt =
1 qt
1  is the e¤ective replacement cost of equity
7. The LHS rep-
resents the expenditure in consumption and equity, whereas the RHS exhibits
the investors net worth:

rt +

qRt (1  't) + qt't


	
nt and ptmt are the
value of equity and money respectively. Notice that investors value a fraction
't of their depreciated equity at market cost, although the rest of it is valued
at replacement cost. This happens because, except when they turn to the
market to sell a fraction 't of nt, investors play the role of equity issuers and
value it accordingly.
Investors choose their consumption level and equity holdings by maximiz-
ing utility, (5), with respect to cit+1 and n
i
t+1, subject to the budget constraint
(16). This already internalizes the conditions for it and mit+1 that result from
the liquidity constraints, (12) and (13), veried in equality. The lagrangean
6A sketch of the proof of Claim 2 is provided in Kiyotaki and Moore (2001).
7An investor who decides to invest in one extra unit of equity must make a downpayment
of 1   qt. However, with this payment she can only obtain a fraction 1    of the extra
equity unit. Hence, the e¤ective price paid by an investor for an extra unit of equity, is given
by qRt =
1 qt
1  .
14
is:
L=E0
1X
t=0
t log
 
cit

+
1X
t=0
E0t

rtnt +

qRt (1  't) + qt't

nt + ptmt   cit   qRt nit+1
	
(17)
The marginal conditions of this problem result in the Euler equation:

(
rt+1 +

qRt+1
 
1  't+1

+ qt+1't+1

qRt
)
=
cit+1
cit
(18)
Given that preferences are logarithmic, one can derive the optimized level of
consumption for each period, as a fraction 1   of the investors net worth8:
cit = (1  )

rtnt +

qt't + (1  't) qRt

nt + ptmt
	
(19)
The level of investment can be obtained using the ow of funds, (15) and
the liquidity constraints with equality, (12):
it =
1
1  qt

(rt + qt't)nt + ptmt   cit

(20)
8This claim can be proved as follows: rst, I substitute the expression for consumption,
(19), in the marginal condition, (18):

rt+1 +  t+1
qRt
=
 
rt+1 +  t+1

nit+1 + pt+1m
i
t+1
(rt +  t)nt + ptmt
where  t =

qRt (1  't) + qt't

. We know from Claim 2 that mit+1 = 0. Hence:

(rt +  t)nt + ptmt
qRt
= nit+1
Then I substitute the above in the ow of funds, (16), and retrieve the expression for the
equilibrium consumption, (19), proving our claim:
cit + q
R
t 
(rt +  t)nt + ptmt
qRt
= (rt +  t)nt + ptmt
cit = (1  ) [(rt +  t)nt + ptmt]
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Condition (20) describes the equilibrium level of investment of the repre-
sentative investor. In words, it simply states that, in real terms, investment
equals the liquid part of net worth that is not used for consumption, once
divided by the required downpayment per unit of investment.
2.2.2 Savers:
We turn to savers now. Their ow of funds is much simpler given that they
must have it = 0:
cst + qt
 
nst+1   nt

+ pt
 
mst+1  mt

= rtnt, or
cst + qtn
s
t+1 + ptm
s
t+1= (rt + qt)nt + ptmt (21)
The LHS of (21) includes all gross expenditures of a representative saver,
while the RHS contains her net worth. Like investors, savers have logarithmic
utility, which means that each saver consumes a fraction (1   ) of her net
worth:
cst = (1  ) [(rt + qt)nt + ptmt] (22)
The following intertemporal marginal conditions for the decision of equity
and money holdings, respectively, must hold:
1
cst
= Et
264 rt+1+[qt+1't+1+(1 't+1)qRt+1]qt u0  csit+1
+(1  ) rt+1+qt+1qt u
0  csst+1
375
1
cst
= Et

pt+1
pt
 
u0
 
csit+1

+ (1  )u0
 
csst+1

(23)
Above I equate the benet of consuming one extra unit in period t, with
the benet of saving one unit of the consumption good in the form of 1qt or
1
pt
units of equity or money, respectively, until period t+1. Denote csit+1
 
csst+1

as
the consumption decision in period t + 1 of a saver that becomes an investor
(remains a saver). Note that in the rst equation I must distinguish between
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the return on equity of a saver who is to become an investor from the one who is
to remain a saver. This results from the fact that savers value equity di¤erently
from investors: in fact, investors produce equity and value it at replacement
cost, whereas savers are equity buyers and thus value it at market cost. This
di¤erence in the return of equity constitutes an idiosyncratic risk faced by
entrepreneurs, who at each point in time, are subject to a stochastic shock
that denes the type of entrepreneur that they are. There is no idiosyncratic
risk, however, in holding money, given that it is totally liquid and therefore
pays the same return whether a saver becomes an investor or stays a saver.
The conditions (23), above imply that the following arbitrage condition
holds:
(1  )Et

rt+1 + qt+1
qt
  pt+1
pt

1
csst+1

= Et
" 
pt+1
pt
 
rt+1 +

qt+1't+1 +
 
1  't+1

qRt+1


qt
!
1
csit+1
#
(24)
Condition (24) denes the liquidity premium in the economy. Note that
the LHS includes the expected gain in holding equity instead of money in the
event of not having an investment opportunity. Instead, the RHS constitutes
the expected gain of holding the most liquid asset (money) instead of the
illiquid one (equity), if the entrepreneur turns out to be an investor. Put in
other words, this equation prescribes how much should the compensation be to
both a saver holding equity instead of money and an investor holding money
instead of equity.
2.3 Equilibrium:
The conditions for an equilibrium can be summarized by the following:
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It=

1  qt

 [(rt + qt't)Kt + ptM ]  (1  ) (1  't)qRt Kt

(25)
Y et = rtKt = atK

t
= It + (1  )

(rt + qt)Kt + ptM +  (1  't)
 
qRt   qt

Kt

(26)
(1  )Et
" rt+1+qt+1
qt
  pt+1pt
(rt+1 + qt+1)N st+1 + pt+1M
#
=
= Et
24 pt+1pt   rt+1+[qt+1't+1+(1 't+1)qRt+1]qt 
rt+1 +

qt't + (1  't) qRt



N st+1 + pt+1M
35 (27)
where at = 

1 
!
 1 
+
(At)
1+
+ and  =  1++ , together with:
wt=

Kt [(1  )At]
1
 !
1

 
+

(28)
Cwt =wtLt (29)
Yt=C
w
t + Y
e
t (30)
Above I dene Y et and C
e
t respectively as aggregate output net of labour
costs and aggregate entrepreneursconsumption and N st+1 as the end of period
equity holdings of savers.
In what follows I explain how these equilibrium conditions are obtained.
The equilibrium consumption and investment conditions for each investor and
saver are linear in the beginning of period levels of money and equity holdings.
Since there are  investors and 1    savers in this economy, and since the
whole stock of capital and money belongs to entrepreneurs, aggregation of
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conditions (19) and (22) is straightfoward and results in:
Cit =  (1  )

rt +
 
qt't + (1  't) qRt



Kt + ptM
	
(31)
Cst = (1  ) (1  ) [(rt + qt)Kt + ptM ] (32)
Sum up the above and obtain aggregate consumption of entrepreneurs:
Cet = (1  )

(rt + qt)Kt + ptM +  (1  't)
 
qRt   qt

Kt
	
(33)
Using the same method, aggregate the investment condition, (20), and use the
aggregate equilibrium consumption of investors, (31), to obtain:
It =

1  qt

 [(rt + qt't)Kt + ptM ]  (1  ) (1  't)qRt Kt

The entrepreneursgoods market clearing condition is:
Y et = rtKt = C
e
t + It
Finally, note that, by the end of the period, savers have bought from investors
all their money (according to Claim 2) and as much equity as the liquidity
constraints allow. This means that they will hold the whole stock of money
by the end of the period and an amount of equity equivalent to N st+1 = It +
'tKt+ (1  )Kt. Using this fact, aggregate the arbitrage condition (24)
and employ it together with the aggregate consumption of investors and savers,
respectively (31) and (32), to obtain:
(1  )Et
" rt+1+qt+1
qt
  pt+1pt
(rt+1 + qt+1)N st+1 + pt+1M
#
=
= Et
24 pt+1pt   rt+1+[qt+1't+1+(1 't+1)qRt+1]qt 
rt+1 +

qt't + (1  't) qRt



N st+1 + pt+1M
35
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Following the original article by Kiyotaki and Moore, the way to proceed
now is to solve for the steady state and to check if claims 1 and 2 are indeed
veried. The steady state is characterized by: At = A, 't = ', I = (1  )K
and qt = q and pt = p. In such case the aggregate investment equation, the
goods market clearing condition and the arbitrage condition, from (25), (26)
and (27) respectively, become:
r+v =

1  +  (1  ) 1  '
1   

 q

1  +  (1  ) 1  '
1   

 q'
(34)
r  (1  ) v =

1  +  (1  ) 1  '
1   

+ q (1  )

1  1  '
1  

(35)
r   q (1  ) = 1  '
1   (q   1)
v
S
+ q
r + 1 '1  + q
' 
1  +
v
S
(36)
where s = N
s
K =  (1  ) + (1   + ') is the fraction of equity held by
savers and v = pMK . One can solve for the rst two equations with respect to
r and v and obtain its expressions as functions of q. Note that v is closely
related to the velocity of money, which is assumed to be constant in the steady
state. To see this notice that v = pMK =
pM
Y
Y
K =
1
V
Y
K , where I denote V as
the velocity of money (recall that, in this context, prices are stated in terms
of consumption goods instead of money). Since YK is constant in the steady
state, it is a necessary condition that V is constant if one wants to nd a
constant value for v in the steady state.
Compute r and v as functions of q and get:
r (q) =
1

264 (1   + ) (1  +  (1  ) )
 q (1  ) ( (1  +  (1  ) ) + '   (1   ))
375
(37)
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v (q) =
1

264 (1  ) (1  +  (1  ) )
 q ( (1  +  (1  ) ) + '+  (1  ) (1   ))
375
(38)
In order to nd the steady state level of q, I simply plug the above into
the steady state arbitrage condition, 36, which becomes a quadratic equation
for q with a unique positive solution. At this point, it is possible to check
that under the conditions of Assumption 1, such solution is guaranteed to be
above unity and below 1 . Indeed this is a Monetary Economy and claims
1 and 2 are veried. It is also possible to prove that near the steady state
solution, the following holds: the return on equity of investors is the lowest in
this economy, followed by the return on money, which in turn is lower than
the return on equity of savers. All these rates of return are lower than the
rate of time preference, which is only surpassed by the marginal productivity
of capital9.
This ordering of interest rates plays a crucial role in this model and is a
direct consequence of having a monetary economy resulting from the liquidity
constraints. It is interesting to see that close to the steady state solution, not
only workers are discouraged from saving, because of too low rates of return,
but also savers lose from holding money and equity instead of consuming. It
is only because they face the possibility of having an investment opportunity
in the future that they decide to save: in such a situation they know that
they will need their own funds to nance the downpayment of the investment
and allow them to produce the maximum possible amount of capital at a cost
lower than the price. It is worth emphasizing that investors want to invest,
not because their perceived return on capital is higher than their subjective
discount rate, but rather because capital sells at a price higher than its cost
(qt > 1).
9Check Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) for a sketch of the proof.
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Notice that the wedge between the rates of return in this economy follows
exclusively from the fact that liquidity constraints are present. If there were no
liquidity constraints, funds would ow from savers to investors until this wedge
had been shut down and capital price equaled its cost. However, because of this
nancial friction, this economy will restrain the ow of funds in a situation in
which investment is still in shortage, but no more funds are available to invest.
Consequently production stops below the First Best level.
The link between asset prices and business cycles lies in the precise fact that
shocks to the resaleability constraint have an impact on both the price of equity
and the amount of investment downpayment that investors are able to make. If
a liquidity shortage occurs ('t su¤ers a negative shock), the economy becomes
more constrained and less funds will ow from savers to investors. Investment
decreases and pulls capital accumulation downwards. Less capital stock results
in a lower real wage rate and in a higher gross prot rate (which is equal to the
marginal productivity of capital in this environment). Entrepreneurs will value
capital relatively more and consequently its price qt will rise. Facing lower
wages, workers decrease their consumption. As for entrepreneurs, even though
they increase their consumption on impact (due to their additional inability to
invest), as their net worth decreases in value they will necessarily decrease their
consumption level. In the end, investment, capital accumulation, consumption
and output will all break down and an economic recession kicks in. Clearly
there exists a feedback from the asset market on macroeconomic aggregates,
as the authors defend.
3 Neoclassical De-construction:
Above, I have summarized the model presented in KM. I am mainly interested
in understanding how this framework can be used to understand the e¤ects
of liquidity and technology shocks in the U.S. economy. However, before I
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proceed to calibrate and simulate this model, it is crucial to understand how
it works. For this purpose, in this section I start by simulating a standard
Neoclassical growth model and then proceed step by step, adding new fea-
tures to this basic framework until I end up with the KM economy. The rst
step will be to review the simulation results obtained in the model by King
and Rebelo (1999), with the di¤erence that I will not include deterministic
technology growth in the model. Next, I will use a particular specication
of the preferences in KM, i.e. the preferences in Greenwood, Herkowitz, and
Hu¤man (1988) - also referred to as GHH from this point onwards. In a third
step towards the KM model, I will introduce a distinction between two types
of agents in the economy. Finally, in Section 5, I will include the two nancial
constraints presented above and allow for liquidity shocks. In each step I will
be checking for changes in volatility, comovement and persistence when sto-
chastic shocks are fed into the model and the simulation is performed. My goal
is to compare the ability of each model to replicate fundamental real business
cycles properties of the U.S. economy and to understand in which way the
liquidity constraints may bring about changes in the ability of Neoclassical
models to reproduce these RBC properties. In practice I will be deriving some
crucial RBC moments and comparing them with the corresponding statistics
for the U.S. economy, as carefully presented in Stock andWatson (1998). Table
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1 synthesizes these statistics:
Table 1: Business Cycle Statistics for the U.S. Economy
Variable St Dev Relative St Dev Autocorrelation Correlation with Y
Y 1.81 1.00 0.84 1.00
C 1.35 0.74 0.80 0.88
I 5.30 2.93 0.87 0.80
L 1.79 0.99 0.88 0.88
Y/L 1.02 0.56 0.74 0.55
w 0.68 0.38 0.66 0.12
r 0.30 0.16 0.60 -0.35
A 0.98 0.54 0.74 0.78
Values in Table 1 are presented in log-deviations from the steady state and
in percentage terms.
3.1 Benchmark Neoclassical model:
In the paper by KR the authors consider a standard Neoclassical model in
which households have to choose a path for consumption, labour supply and
asset holdings. This problem can be described by:
Max
fct;lt;at+1g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
log ct + 
(1  lt)1    1
1  
#
s:t: ct + at+1   (1  ) at = wtlt + rtat
where ct is the consumption level, at is the amount of assets held and lt stands
for labour supply. Households receive a rental rate rt for the assets held and
real wage wt for the hours worked. These are paid by competitive rms that
have access to a Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) technology that uses capital
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and labour as inputs. The production function is a Cobb-Douglas:
yt = At (kt)
 (lt)
1 
where lt is the labour demand, kt is the stock of capital of each rm and
At is an aggregate productivity coe¢ cient. Since this is a closed economy
environment it results that at  kt. This economy is hit by stochastic shocks
At that follows an AR(1) Markov process logAt = A logAt 1 + "A, where
"A is an iid random variable with standard deviation A. Finally, contrary
to the case of KR, the model presented here is absent of growth. I perform
this modication to the KR framework given that there is also no economic
deterministic growth going on in the KM framework. This very simple model
is then calibrated in such a way that some stylized facts for the U.S. economy
are met:
KR Model Calibration:
     A A
0.984 3.48 0.333 0.025 1 0.979 0.0072
As in KR, I compute the RBC moments for this economy after simulating
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the model. These are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics for King and Rebelo RBC model
Variable St Dev Relative St Dev Autocorrelation Correlation with Y
Y 1.37 1.00 0.72 1.00
C 0.61 0.45 0.78 0.95
I 4.50 3.29 0.71 0.99
L 0.64 0.47 0.71 0.97
Y/L 0.75 0.55 0.76 0.98
w 0.75 0.55 0.76 0.98
r 0.05 0.04 0.71 0.96
A 0.93 0.68 0.72 0.99
The simulated shocks produce a model that is almost as volatile as the data
for the U.S. economy. In relative terms, consumption is two thirds smoother
than output and investment three times as volatile. Although consumption
lacks some volatility these results are more or less in line with the data. The
model fails though, in explaining the observed volatility in hours: the sim-
ulated standard deviation of 0:64% compares to the observed 1:79% in the
U.S. data. Conversely, the real interest rate observed volatility of 0:30% is
underestimated by the model which leaves this standard deviation at 0:05%.
Persistence is reasonably well predicted by the model. Nevertheless, underesti-
mation is present in most variables and is particularly relevant for consumption
and output. On the contrary, both real prices are slightly more persistent in
the model than in the data. Finally, comovement comes with the right sign for
all variables but the real interest rate. Indeed, in Table 1 one can see that the
real interest rate is countercyclical in the U.S. economy, whereas in Table 2
the simulated correlation coe¢ cient between the real interest rate and output
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is positive and close to one10.
Moreover, in general, variables are too correlated with output when com-
pared with the data, particularly real wages, for which the observed correlation
coe¢ cient is 0:12 whereas the model predicts it to be of the order of 0:98.
Despite the referred aws, I use this model as a benchmark for a good
RBC simulation and compare it with the next simulations.
3.2 Neoclassical model with GHH preferences:
Consider now a slightly di¤erent Neoclassical Growth model where there is a
unit measure of innitely lived consumers with preferences:
E0
1X
t=0
tU

ct  
!
1 + 
(lt)
1+

where U (:) is increasing and strictly concave. Note that this formulation for
preferences is the one present in KM. Following GHH, let the functional form
for the utility function be:
U (ct; lt) =

ct   !1+ (lt)
1+
1 
  1
1  
From this type of preferences one can derive the marginal utility of con-
sumption Uc (t) = 1(ct  !1+ (lt)
1+)
 and the marginal disutility of labour Ul (t) =
 !lt
(ct  !1+ (lt)
1+)
 . The equilibrium conditions for households are:
lt=
wt
!
 1

(39)
1= Et
"
(rt + 1  )
 
ct   !1+ (lt)
1+
ct+1   !1+ (lt+1)
1+
!#
(40)
As above, rms equate the marginal utility of capital and labour to its respec-
10There is some debate, though, on whether the real interest rate is indeed countercyclical.
In fact, Teles and Brito (2004) nd that the real interest rate can be procyclical, in times of
high ination rate.
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tive rates of return:
rt= At

lt
kt
1 
(41)
wt= (1  )At

kt
lt

(42)
Finally, the goods market clearing condition and the law of capital accumula-
tion are:
yt=At (kt)
 (lt)
1  = ct + it (43)
it= kt+1   (1  ) kt (44)
The above, together with the law of motion for the technology shock logAt =
A logAt 1 + "A, constitute the equilibrium conditions for this model.
Next, I proceed as above and calibrate the model so as to replicate some
stylized features of the U.S. economy. As in KR, I set  = 0:984, so that
the steady state annual interest rate equals 6:5%. Following the same paper,
I choose the depreciation rate to be 10% per annum (which means that I
assume KY = 10 and
I
Y = 0:25). This leads to a quarterly gross depreciation
rate 1    = 0:975. For the utility function parameters I set  = 0:6 as in
GHH, but choose a smaller value for the coe¢ cient of risk aversion  = 0:5
(rather than 1:001 as in GHH), to compensate for the inexistence of investment
shocks in this model, contrary to the case in the GHH article. At last, with
this calibration in mind, I choose ! = 4:09, so that the average fraction of
time spent working in the steady state equals 20%, as is commonly accepted
in the literature for the U.S. economy. The same technology shocks as above
are then performed and the resulting RBC moments are presented in Table 3.
Consumption volatility increases at the expense of a lower investment vari-
ability: the standard deviation of consumption is now approximately 60% that
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of output, while investment sees its variability slightly decreased to 2:84 times
the volatility of output, but still roughly in line with the data. A notable
improvement is made on the volatility of labour, which now accounts for 63%
that of output. One last remark to the volatility of real wages which is now
exactly in line with the data. Almost no changes are noticeable in what con-
cerns persistence: as in King and Rebelo, this model still underestimates the
persistence of most variables (only real prices presidencies are overestimated).
Finally, comovement results are also similar to those in KR, even if they are
further away from the ones from the data.
Table 3: Business Cycle Statistics for a basic, GHH utility, RBC model
Variable St Dev Relative St Dev Autocorrelation Correlation with Y
Y 1.62 1.00 0.73 1.00
C 0.90 0.56 0.77 0.98
I 4.60 2.84 0.72 0.99
L 1.01 0.63 0.73 1.00
Y/L 0.61 0.38 0.73 1.00
w 0.61 0.38 0.73 1.00
r 0.06 0.04 0.72 0.97
A 0.94 0.58 0.72 0.99
One can therefore conclude that, changing the functional form of pref-
erences, does not signicantly interfere with the capacity of the Neoclassical
framework, to produce time series for the macroeconomic aggregates and prices
that perform reasonably well in predicting the observed volatility, persistence
and comovement in the U.S. data. Actually, despite the increased overesti-
mation of comovement, GHH preferences equip the Neoclassical model with a
better capacity to replicate the volatility in hours and consumption veried in
the data.
29
3.3 Model with workers and capital owners:
In this section I introduce a distinction between two types of agents: workers
and capital owners. These play di¤erent roles in the economy, similarly to
what happens in KM, but without the nancial constraints. As in KM, I
assume that workers want to consume all their labour income. This is an
absurd claim, given that nothing structurally prevents workers from wanting
to save and smooth consumption. Indeed, in this framework the rate of return
on capital equates the rate of time preference, thus providing an incentive for
workers to save. Nonetheless, I keep this assumption, on the grounds that it is
a step forward towards the model in KM. In practice, as we have already seen,
this claim is veried in a neighborhood of the steady state in the model of KM,
provided that the liquidity constraints are stringent enough. In the end, this
fact will play a crucial role on the performance of the model to replicate the
U.S. real business cycles statistics and therefore is worth analyzing separately,
in the absence of liquidity constraints.
Assume there is a unit measure of both workers and capital owners. Work-
ers have preferences:
E0
1X
t=0
t

cwt   !1+ (l
w
t )
1+
1 
  1
1  
as in the previous case, whereas capital owners have preferences of consump-
tion, ckt :
E0
1X
t=0
t log

ckt

and have access to a Cobb-Douglas production technology yt = At (kt)
  lkt 1  ,
where lkt is the labour demand. With the output of their production, capital
owners pay for labour, consume and invest in new capital. The ow of funds
is:
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ckt + kt+1   (1  ) kt = At (kt)


lkt
1 
  wtlkt
The Lagrangean for the problem of a representative capital-owner is:
L=E0
1X
t=0
t log

ckt

+
1X
t=0
E0t

At (kt)


lkt
1 
+ (1  ) kt   wtlkt   ckt   kt+1

Derive the rst order conditions of the Lagrangean and work them out to
obtain the equilibrium conditions:
1
ckt
= Et
1
ckt+1


yt+1
kt+1
+ 1  

(45)
wt= (1  )At

kt
lkt

(46)
From the Euler Equation, (45), one can see that the gross prot, which I
dene as rt, is equal to its marginal productivity:
rt = 
yt
kt
(47)
As in the KM model, preferences are logarithmic and, therefore, the optimal
level of consumption for a representative capital owner is a fraction 1    of
his net worth. In this context, the net worth is the valuation of the capital
held by the agent at any given point in time, for a given rate of return rt and
depreciation rate . Hence, consumption results in:
ckt = (1  ) (rt + 1  ) kt (48)
As for workers, I set their consumption xed and equal to the income from
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labour:
cwt = wtl
w
t (49)
The labour supply, instead, results from equating the marginal rate of substi-
tution to the real wage rate:
lwt =
wt
!
 1

(50)
The aggregate conditions corresponding to expressions (45) to (50), together
with the goods market clearing condition Yt = Ckt + C
w
t + It and the law of
motion for capital It = Kt+1 (1  )Kt, constitute the equilibrium conditions
for this economy.
I apply the same calibration to this model as the one in the model without
the distinction between workers and capital owners and produce the same
technology shocks. The RBC statistics for this model are presented in Table
4. Comparing the simulation moments of this model with the ones presented
in Table 3, we can conclude that, intuitively, non-optimizing workers lead to a
much greater consumption volatility than before - it now accounts for almost
85% of the outputs standard deviation -, investment loses a great amount
of variability - it is now only 1:63 times as volatile as output - and all other
variables keep approximately the same standard deviation. In what concerns
persistence and comovement, this model produces statistics that are identical
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to the ones resulting from the previous model.
Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics for a model with workers
and capital owners and GHH utility
Variable St Dev Relative St Dev Autocorrelation Correlation with Y
Y 1.60 1.00 0.72 1.00
C 1.35 0.84 0.73 1.00
I 2.60 1.63 0.72 0.99
L 1.00 0.63 0.73 1.00
Y/L 0.60 0.38 0.73 1.00
w 0.60 0.38 0.73 1.00
r 0.07 0.04 0.72 0.99
A 0.94 0.59 0.72 0.99
Hence, when one distinguishes between workers and capital owners and
forces the rst to consume their entire labour income, the model performance
in predicting the RBC features of the U.S. economy changes considerably. This
results from the fact that consumption and investment volatility, respectively,
increase and decrease signicantly. This comes at no surprise, given that, by
inhibiting workers from saving, I am depriving a proportion of agents from the
ability to smooth consumption. In boom times, consumption from workers is
too high and funds that would otherwise be used for investment are consumed.
Conversely, during recession periods, workers consume too little, given that
they do not dispose of any savings to smooth their behavior. This fact will
play a crucial role in the simulation of the model by Kiyotaki and Moore, in
which case the claim that workers consume their labour income is legitimated
by the fact that liquidity constraints indeed prevent workers from wanting to
save.
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4 Calibration:
Before I take the nal step and perform the dynamic analysis and simulation of
the model in KM, I must go through the details of the calibration. As before,
I am calibrating this economy assuming that each period represents a quarter.
First, following KR, assume that the capital-output ratio is KY = 10 and that
the investment-capital ratio is IY = 0:25. These lead to a quarterly gross rate
of depreciation  = 1  I=YK=Y = 0:975. In what concerns the elasticity of labour
supply, I set  = 0:6 as described above. Note that in the a First Best solution,
with no nancial constraints, the gross prot rate (or the marginal productivity
of capital) is equal to the rate of time preference. Such equilibrium is one of the
possible outcomes of the current model - one in which the liquidity constraints
are set to  = ' = 1 and the gross prot rate rt corresponds to the real
interest rate - hence, I use this result to calibrate the discount factor : again,
following KR set the real interest rate at 6:5% per annum in the First Best
scenario, which implies that  is set to 0:984 on a quarterly basis. With this
calibration in mind, I choose a value for ! that guarantees that the average
fraction of time spent working in the steady state equilibrium equals 20%, as
is commonly accepted in the literature for the U.S. economy.
My aim is to calibrate this economy in such a way that the level of q
resulting from the steady state equilibrium is in line with the average q for
the U.S. economy, as estimated in Laitner and Stolyarov (2003) - LS in what
follows. In this article the authors use U.S. annual investment data from 1953
to 2001 in order to estimate a time series for q. According to their study, the
level of q averaged 1:2075 during their period of analysis. I consider this to be
the steady state level for q and calibrate the nancial constraints accordingly.
Consider the resaleability constraint rst. It is not straightforward to nd
an empirical support for this type of nancial restriction. However, a detailed
estimation of the average post-war liquidity share in the U.S. economy is pre-
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sented in Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero and Kiyotaki (2009) - henceforth, NEFK
- and used to match the same resaleability constraint. I follow this article
in order to calibrate the stochastic liquidity shock. I construct an historical
series from 1952jQ1 to 2008jQ4 for the liquidity share in the U.S. as dened
in NEFK: LSt =
ptMt
ptMt+qtKt
. From this data I extract the average liquidity
share and its autocorrelation and standard deviation coe¢ cients. These are
given by 'ss = 0:11, ' = 0:969 and ' = 0:029 and provide an estimation
for steady state level of ' and for its law of motion, when calibrated for the
U.S. economy11. In what concerns the borrowing constraint I choose  so that
the leverage ratio in this economy is in line with the observed average debt-
to-equity ratio of four in the U.S. economy - in line with Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2009). For each unit of investment, an entrepreneur borrows an amount q
from savers and nances 1  q with her own funds. Hence I set:
4 =
q
1  q
)  t 66:3%
I am left with the investment opportunity arrival rate  to calibrate. Since
there is no obvious direct evidence for this rate, I choose the value of  in
such a way that the level of q resulting from the steady state equilibrium in
this economy is given by q = 1:2075, in line with LS, as previously referred12.
Such calibration implies that each quarter an entrepreneur has a probability
11Notice that, although 't is dened as the rate at which an entrepreneur can alienate her
old equity holdings, in order to fund her investment opportunity (i.e. as a ow variable),
hereby I am tracking it with a picture of how liquid an economy is on average (i.e. as a stock
variable). Clearly the stock of liquidity in a given economy is intrinsically related with the
velocity with which one is converting the illiquid asset (equity) into the liquid one (money).
Following NEFK, I argue that, on average, the velocity at which equity is exchanged for
money equates the aggregate liquidity share.
12 In Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero and Kiyotaki (2009), the authors directly calibrate the
investment opportunities arrival rate at 7% per quarter. They argue that this value is
probably an upper bound for this coe¢ cient.
Instead in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) the authors simply set this rate at 25% so that
each year an entrepreneur has on average one investment opportunity.
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of approximately 1:82% of facing an investment opportunity.
The calibration of this model is summarized in the following table:
KM Model Calibration:
   !  ' 
0.984 0.6 0.975 4.67 0.663 0.11 0.018
In what concerns the stochastic technology coe¢ cient At it is easy to choose
a law motion: following KR, simply set A = 0:0979 and A = 0:0072 as I
have already done for the simplied Neoclassical models presented above.
5 Dynamics:
In this section I analyze the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates and
prices in the model by KM, when hit by shocks in the stochastic variables.
Although the model of KM incorporates only two stochastic variables (At and
't), I treat an extra couple of parameters as such, in order to understand how
the model reacts to sudden changes in both the arrival rate of investment 
and in the borrowing constraint .
I start with a shock to the productivity variable At and suppose that its
law of motion is given by log (At) = A log (At 1)+"
A
t , where the error term "
A
t
is the iid technology shock. I am interested in analyzing the impulse response
functions of prices and aggregates to unexpected changes in the technology
coe¢ cient. Following the above described calibration, I set A = 0:979 and I
consider a 1% shock to At. The impulse response functions for this shock are
presented in Figures 2a and 2b in appendix.
When the productivity shock hits the economy, the marginal productivity
increases and departs further from the rate of time preference. This means
that the economy becomes virtually more constrained: each unit of investment
funds is now relatively more valuable. Ideally, capital accumulation would
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respond and drive its marginal productivity downwards until the subjective
discount rate was reached. In this setup, though, capital production is con-
strained, which means that an increase in the marginal productivity of capital
boosts its value and leads to an increase in its price qt. A higher equity price
decreases the downpayment required per unit of investment. Hence, invest-
ment increases and pushes capital accumulation upwards. Given that money
is an input for investment, the increase in qt drives the price of money pt up-
wards. The upward reaction in both prices and in the productivity of capital,
in turn, increases the value of entrepreneursnet worth, this way fuelling the
rise in investment and consumption. In the mean time, a higher capital stock
leads to an increase in the real wage rate, which results in a higher consump-
tion level of workers. Entrepreneurs, however, will consume less on impact,
due to the increased attractiveness of investment that constitutes a strong sub-
stitution e¤ect. On aggregate, consumption starts by responding downwards,
only to increase as the shock vanishes and output expands, allowing for the
income e¤ect to exceed the substitution e¤ect.
From the above we can conclude that this model includes an amplication
e¤ect. Note that, after the liquidity shock, investment jumps in response to
the rise in the marginal productivity of capital, as usual. However, as prices
rise in response to the higher value of capital, the net worth of entrepreneurs
increases in value, providing more funds for investment. Furthermore, also the
required downpayment 1 qt decreases as the price of capital rises, providing
an additional source of investment growth.
Consider a persistent negative shock to the resaleability constraint. As
dened in Section 4, 't follows an AR(1) Markov process that is stationary
around 'ss = 0:11. Thus we have 't =
 
1  '

'ss + ''t 1 + "
'
t where
"'t is the iid resaleability shock. Figures 3a and 3b show the e¤ects on the
macroeconomic aggregates and prices of an unexpected persistent negative
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shock to '. Following the calibration in Section 4 set ' = 0:969. As for the
scale of the shock I consider a liquidity deterioration in which 't decreases by
1p:p:.
When 't decreases investors see their ability to raise funds, out of their pre-
viously held equity, reduced. The amount of equity converted into investment
funds decreases, meaning that investment decelerates and capital accumula-
tion drops, pushing its marginal productivity upwards. In what concerns the
price of equity, two contradictory forces are at place. On the one hand, equity
is now less desirable, given that is relatively less liquid than before. Entrepre-
neurs perform a so called ight to quality and demand more money and less
equity, this way driving the price of equity qt downwards. On the other hand
though, and most importantly, capital is now scarcer and its marginal pro-
ductivity higher. This means that each unit of equity used by entrepreneurs
for investment is now more valuable, and this ultimately pushes the price of
equity qt upwards. We can see from Figure 3b that, in the end, this second
e¤ect prevails and qt raises in response to a negative shock to 't. Intuitively,
since we are further departing from a situation where there is no resaleability
constraint on equity and where the price of capital equals its cost (qt = 1), it
bets naturally that a sudden reduction in liquidity drives the price of capital
upwards. The higher demand for money resulting from the ight to quality,
together with the increased value of investment, both lead to an increase in
its price pt. As for consumption, it will be driven upwards on impact, due to
the substitution e¤ect created by the increased funding di¢ culties. However,
as capital accumulation freezes and investment slows down, output falls and
inevitably consumption is pushed downwards. Note that consumption of each
type of agent reacts di¤erently: while entrepreneurs decide to consume more
on impact, only to decrease their consumption as output slows down, workers
immediately decrease their consumption in response to lower wages.
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Interestingly, in the case of a stochastic shock to liquidity, this model im-
plies a absorption rather than an amplication e¤ect. In fact, as the resaleabil-
ity shock hits the economy, investment breaks and leads capital accumulation,
consumption and output downwards. However, as asset prices react positively,
entrepreneurspain is relieved by an increase in their net worth value, which,
in turn, cushions the drop in the macroeconomic aggregates.
It is clear from this analysis that a liquidity shock can qualitatively repro-
duce an economic recession like the one the world economy has been facing
since the summer of 2007. Furthermore, it is interesting to see that even a
transitory shock to 't can produce a long-lived recession: if we set ' = 0
and simulate the same liquidity shock as above, it can be seen from Figure 3c
and Figure 3d that, although prices and investment swiftly return to normal
as the shock vanishes, capital accumulation, consumption, output, real wages
and the gross prot rate take a lot longer to retrieve to their steady state level.
If, instead, we consider a shock to the borrowing constraint coe¢ cient ,
very similar qualitative results are obtained. Assume that, t follows an AR(1)
Markov process: t = (1  ) ss+t 1+ "t . In Section 4 I have calibrated
the steady state borrowing constraint parameter ss = 0:663, but not the
persistence or scale of its shock, given that  is set constant in KM. As I am
only interested in checking for the qualitative impact of a persistent shock
to the borrowing constraint, I take a shortcut and use the same persistence
coe¢ cient as I did with the resaleability constraint:  = 0:969. The graphics
for the impulse response functions of a sudden decrease of one 1p:p: in t, are
depicted in gures 4a and 4b.
When t decreases, a higher downpayment will be required per unit of
investment. Investors will, suddenly, be incapable of leveraging as much output
claims as they did before. Hence, the ability of investors to issue inside equity
is further reduced, this way depriving the economy from an important source
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of liquidity. Aggregate investment decreases due to the shortage of funds and
along with it capital accumulation decelerates. For lower levels of capital
stock, the marginal productivity of capital rt rises. As with the shock to 't,
the price of equity su¤ers two distinct e¤ects: the rst one pushes qt upwards
and results from the increased value of capital (income e¤ect), whereas the
second one drives qt downwards and results from the entrepreneursportfolio
adjustment (substitution e¤ect). In the end the income e¤ect prevails and qt
responds upwards. As before, the price of money pt is driven upwards by the
adjustment in the portfolio composition and the increased value of investment.
Finally, like with the shock to ', aggregate consumption responds positively
at rst, but eventually starts to decrease as the income e¤ect surpasses the
substitution e¤ect.
One can therefore conclude, that a reduction in the pledgeable fraction
of investment leads to the same qualitative results produced by a contraction
in the resaleability of equity, even though the triggering shock is structurally
di¤erent: in fact, a shock to t has an impact directly on the downpayment
of investment and constitutes a shock to the leveraging ability of investors; a
shock to 't, instead, decreases the ability of investors to resell their equity,
with only indirect e¤ects on the required downpayment.
Finally, consider a persistent shock in the arrival rate of investment op-
portunities . The impulse response functions of macroeconomic aggregates
and prices, with respect to a 1p:p: increase in , are plotted in gures 5a
and 5b respectively. Dene t as an AR (1) Markov process that is station-
ary around some steady state which I denote as ss. This way one can write
t = (1  )ss + t 1 + "t where "t is an iid shock. Recall that there is
no aim at correctly microfounding the arrival rate of investment opportunities.
Instead, I choose a calibration procedure that forces this economy to be in a
monetary equilibrium, with a steady state Tobins q that is in line with LS.
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For this reason, I pick ss = 0:018 and simply set the persistence coe¢ cient
to be  = 0:95, so that we can capture the e¤ects of a persistent decrease in
the investment opportunities arrival rate. I study the impact of a rise in t of
one percentage point.
In order to understand the qualitative impact of a shock to t, it is useful
to think about an extreme situation in which entrepreneurs face an investment
opportunity with probability one ( = 1): in such case, investment opportu-
nities are useless, given that, although every entrepreneur wants to sell equity
claims, there is no demand for them, for the simple reason that savers have
been extinguished. The only logical equilibrium in such situation is to have
qt = 1 and pt = 0, which means that investors are indi¤erent between invest-
ing and saving, and money, as a consequence, plays no role in this economy.
Therefore, if one considers a positive shock that departs from ss, it is only
reasonable to expect that when the arrival rate of investment opportunities
rises, prices of both assets should fall. From the equilibrium conditions, it
can be seen that a rise in t leads to an increase in the aggregate investment
that is independent of the downpayment required per unit of output invested:
investment rises simply because there are more people investing. Capital accu-
mulation necessarily soars and, in the mean time, consumption breaks down,
given that there is now a larger fraction of agents in the economy who have
access to investment and thus value consumption relatively less.
In a sense, a positive shock to t increases the ability of this economy
to avoid the liquidity constraint. Liquidity is the more important the more
infrequent are investment opportunities. The main reason for this to happen
hinges on the fact that with a lower fraction of savers in the economy, there
are less funds to be transferred from savers to investors and, therefore, the
restringency in the ow of these funds (i.e. the liquidity constraint) loses
importance and the economy approaches the First Best resource allocation.
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6 Simulation:
In this section I simulate the model in KM with two distinct structures. First
I assume that only the technology is stochastic and then also consider 't to be
a stochastic variable and simulate the model with its original structure, as pre-
sented in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). I calibrate the model following Section
4 and simulate it using Dynare (v.4.0.4) - the same software package was used
to simulate the above presented models. The results for the RBC moments of
these simulations are displayed in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively, for the
two cases above.
I start by simulating a version of KM in which only At is stochastic. If
one analysis the evolution of the RBC statistics in Section 3, as I introduce
new ingredients to a standard Neoclassical model, one can clearly see that
the crucial changes have occurred when I have distinguished between workers
and capital owners, and forced workers to consume their entire income. This
distinction, as explained above, brings a lot less volatility to investment and
much more variation to consumption. Recall that when I rst introduced this
distinction between agents, I was mainly interested in studying the impact of
introducing workers, who are discouraged from saving by rates of return that
are lower than the rate of time preference. Evidently, this is not the case when
the liquidity constraints are absent in the model and, thus, such claim made
no economic sense in that context. However, by creating this distinction we
are able to distinctly observe the e¤ects of two di¤erent impacts of adding up
liquidity constraints in the model of KM: on the one hand, liquidity constraints
have a direct impact on the RBC statistics that comes from the equilibrium
conditions of the model; on the other hand, liquidity constraints legitimate
the claim that workers will not save in the steady state, by driving the return
on both equity and money, to levels that are lower than the time preference
rate. Indeed, it is this indirect e¤ect that plays the most important role in
42
this model.
Table 5: Business Cycle Statistics for KM model with stochastic At:
Variable St Dev Relative St Dev Autocorrelation Correlation with Y
Y 1.60 1.00 0.72 1.000
C 1.40 0.87 0.72 1.000
I 2.55 1.59 0.72 0.999
L 1.00 0.63 0.72 1.000
Y/L 0.60 0.38 0.72 1.000
w 0.60 0.38 0.72 1.000
r 0.08 0.05 0.72 0.990
A 0.94 0.59 0.72 0.997
q 0.39 0.24 0.72 0.992
p 1.25 0.78 0.72 1.000
If one compares the results in Table 4 with the ones in Table 5, one can
see that the liquidity constraints per se, only emphasize slightly more the
reduction in the volatility of investment and the increased variation of con-
sumption. We can therefore conclude, that the main departure of these RBC
statistics from the results produced by a standard Neoclassical one, derives
from the fact that including nancial constraints brings the return on equity
and money lower than the subjective discount rate: those who do not face
investment opportunities have no incentives to save, and this ultimately re-
sults in a major increase in the volatility of consumption at the expense of
investment. Consequently, one can ascertain that the liquidity constraints de-
crease the volatility of investment in the model, not so much directly, through
their impact on the optimal decision of entrepreneurs, but rather indirectly by
inhibiting workers from saving.
It is now time to simulate the original KM model with both the technology
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parameter At and the resaleability constraint 't dened as stochastic. The
introduction of 't as a stochastic variable will provoke crucial changes to the
statistics presented in Table 5. First of all, and most notoriously, the volatility
of asset prices and investment su¤ers a remarkable increase. The standard
deviation of qt jumps from 0:39% to 1:97% which is almost in line with the
2:15% volatility Tobins q observed for the U.S. economy and found by LS.
I interpret the results for the volatility of pt, by constructing an historical
series for the 3-month Treasury Bill rate, using data from Table H.15 of the
Federal Reserve Statistical Release. For the period of analysis between 1953
and 2000, I nd that the quarterly volatility of the 3-month T-Bills rate is
2:80% relative to its steady state value. We can compare this value with
the standard deviation coe¢ cient for the Return On Money rMt =
pt+1 pt
pt
,
resulting from the model of 0:40%. We can see that, although the standard
deviation of pt is much more signicant when KM is fed with liquidity shocks,
the model is still not able to retrieve a variability in the return of money
that is consistent with the data. In fact, this model still underestimates the
variability of pt, even though we can see a clear improvement in predicting the
observed volatility, once 't is allowed to stochastically change over time. As a
consequence of more volatile asset prices, Investment now uctuates more than
two times as much as output. This is still short when compared to the data,
but constitutes a great improvement when compared with the results in Table
4. Although less impetuously, consumption also increases its variability from
1:40% to 1:49% and is now 90% as volatile as output. Unfortunately, it turns
out that, adding the shock to the resaleability constraint further deteriorates
the ability of this model to retrieve a consumption volatility that is in line
with the U.S. data. All other aggregates and prices maintain their standard
variations fairly at the same level.
Intuitively, persistence is not altered in this model, given that I have in-
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troduced a shock that is basically as persistent as the technology shock. On
the contrary, in what concerns comovement, some alterations are in place.
Investment loses much of its contemporaneous correlation with output and is
now fairly well predicted by the model. In fact the correlation coe¢ cient for
investment changes from broadly 1:00 in Table 4 to 0:75 in Table 5, which
compares to the observed 0:80 as presented in Table 1. Interestingly, this is a
much better result than the one obtained in the standard Neoclassical model
simulation, presented in Table 2. As for consumption, there is a reduction in
the contemporaneous correlation with output (from 1:00 to 0:94) that leaves
this coe¢ cient fairly similar to the one predicted by a standard Neoclassical
model. Finally, also p and q become much less correlated with output. Recall
from Table 5 that asset prices moved almost one to one with the product. In-
stead, in Table 6 it is clear that both q and p are now hardly procyclical, with
correlation coe¢ cients of just 0:201 and 0:105 respectively. All other variables
maintain their comovement almost unchanged.
Table 6: Business Cycle Statistics for KM model with stochastic At and 't:
Variable St Dev Relative St Dev Autocorrelation Correlation with Y
Y 1.61 1.00 0.73 1.000
C 1.49 0.93 0.73 0.942
I 3.40 2.12 0.72 0.745
L 1.00 0.63 0.73 1.000
Y/L 0.60 0.38 0.73 1.000
w 0.60 0.38 0.73 1.000
r 0.08 0.05 0.72 0.981
A 0.94 0.58 0.72 0.994
q 1.97 1.25 0.72 0.201
p 12.61 7.85 0.72 0.105
45
The introduction of shocks to the resaleability of equity dened as in KM
brings about a fairly good prediction of the RBC statistics for the U.S. econ-
omy, even though investment is less volatile than desirable and consumption
less smooth than appropriate. Moreover, another achievement of this model
is that it justies the volatility in asset prices as a normal feature of a mon-
etary economy that is subject to liquidity shocks, even though asset prices
still uctuate more in the data than in the model. It is also interesting to
see the decomposition of the variance, as presented in Table 7 in appendix:
although 't only justies a tiny fraction of the variation in output, labour,
labour productivity, wages and gross prot rate, it explains 12% and 43% of
the variances of consumption and investment, respectively, and essentially all
the variation of asset prices p and q.
It is useful to recapitulate what has been done so far. I have started by
replicating a standard Neoclassical model that included a stochastic shock to
productivity and simulated it to obtain a benchmark for how well a model
should behave, in predicting the RBC statistics for the U.S. economy. Once
I have introduced the GHH preferences and the distinction between workers -
who consumed all their income by denition - and capital owners, I have dis-
covered that the same stochastic shock to productivity led to a great reduction
in the ability of the model to predict the volatility of investment and consump-
tion, veried in the data. Indeed, consumption gains too much impetus and
varies almost as much as output, whereas investment sees its variability de-
crease from three times that of output to nearly the same level of variation.
The next step was to include nancial frictions. For that purpose I have intro-
duced the liquidity constraints  and ' set to be constant in the model. These
justied the claim that, in equilibrium, workers would not want to save, given
that the steady state rates of return on savings resulted lower than the time
preference rate. Finally, I have taken the last step and allowed the resaleabil-
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ity coe¢ cient 't to vary stochastically. A reasonable calibration for the law
of motion of 't recovered some of the investments volatility (although not
enough to approximate the one observed in the data and reproduced by the
standard Neoclassical model) and set its contemporaneous correlation with
output more or less in line with the data. Consumption volatility, instead,
drifted further away from the observed 74%, to 93% as variable as output. At
last, asset prices volatility jumped to much greater levels - much closer to the
ones observed in the data -, denouncing the ability of this model to explain
the paradox of excess asset price variability.
A crucial characteristic of this simulation is worth emphasizing as a nal
result. Although it is clear that, in the steady state, the rate of return on
both assets is lower than the time preference rate, it is not certain that, when
one feeds this economy with reasonably calibrated shocks to liquidity and
technology, these rates of return will not respond strongly enough to exceed
the subjective discount rate. In fact, this would contradict Claim 1, according
to which workers want to consume all their labour income. It turns out that
this claim is frequently violated in this simulation, as I am about to check. In
Figure 1a and Figure 1b I present a simulated time series with 1000 periods
for the Return on Money (ROM) and Return on Equity (ROE) - as perceived
by a saver - against the Time Preference Rate (TPR). The series for the model
where only At is stochastic are represented in dashed lines, whereas the series
for the original KM model with 't stochastic are represented in solid lines.
It is clear-cut, for the time periods represented, that the return on money
is smooth enough not to beat the time preference rate, even when liquidity
shocks are fed into the model. However, in Figure 1b one can see that the
ROE frequently exceeds the TPR in the original KM model. In fact, only in
the case when ' is dened as a xed variable, will this simulation produce a
ROE that does not surpass the TPR. We can therefore conclude that Claim
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1 is violated very frequently by this model, and that although the claim that
workers consume all their income is valid for the steady state of this economy,
the same is not true when one feeds this model with stochastic shocks that
are calibrated for the U.S. economy.
Figure 1a: ROM vs TPR:
Figure 1b: ROE vs TPR:
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Recall that Claim 1 is the main cause for the reduced volatility of invest-
ment and increased variability of consumption, and the sole explanation, put
forward by the authors, for the reduced rate of participation in asset-markets.
The violation of this claim, however, raises some doubts on the robustness of
the results obtained in the simulation performed in this section and should
therefore be taken care of.
Allowing workers to occasionally save will allow us to avoid this viola-
tion. However, such alteration is beyond the scope of this article. I should,
nonetheless, emphasize the need to solve for this structural problem, in future
research regarding the RBC properties of KM, if we want to seriously consider
this model for policy analysis purposes.
7 Conclusion:
In the previous sections of this article I have exhaustively analyzed the RBC
performance of the KM model. Broadly speaking, this new framework for
studying money and liquidity, in a DSGE environment, proves to be very well
equipped to replicate some remarkable features of the U.S. real business cycle
statistics.
From the simulation results obtained, we can conclude that KM, not only
maintains some crucial results from the simulation of a standard Neoclassical
model (despite the decrease in the volatility of investment and the increased
variability of consumption), but also provides some very positive contributes
to improving the RBC performance of Neoclassical models. In fact, the sim-
ulation results for KM bring about a better prediction for the volatility of
hours, real wages and labour productivity, together with a more precise esti-
mation of the contemporaneous correlation coe¢ cient between investment and
output, when compared to the benchmark KR model. Moreover, and most
striking of all, the simulation of KM retrieves a volatility of asset prices that
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constitutes a fairly good prediction of the observed variation for the post-War
U.S. economy.
Scrutinizing the impact of each new feature in KM, as compared to a stan-
dard Neoclassical model, also proved fruitful in understanding the structural
causes for the previously referred breakthrough results. Indeed the following
conclusions were taken:
 GHH preferences, alone, provide better simulation results for the volatil-
ity of hours, real wage rate and labour productivity, despite the deteri-
oration in the comovement coe¢ cients of most variables.
 Including liquidity constraints deteriorates the capacity of the model to
produce the observed volatility of consumption and investment. The
reason for this hinges, above all, on the fact that Claim 1, according
to which workers prefer not to save, is legitimated, rather than on the
impact caused by ' and  on the equilibrium conditions of entrepreneurs.
 Allowing for shocks to the resaleability of equity ('t) is essential to
bring back part of the observed volatility of investment (as well as its
comovement coe¢ cient) and most of the variation of asset prices.
Despite these positive conclusions, one note of caution should be made: the
simulation results obtained rely on the assumption that workers never want
to save, given the low steady state saving rates. However, as I have veried
in the Section 6, this claim is very often broken, when shocks to At and 't,
calibrated for the U.S. economy, are fed into the model. My prediction is
that if one allows for workers to save, this model will recuperate the ability to
produce the observed volatility of consumption and investment and also further
intensify the volatility of asset prices, which, I recall, is still underestimated
by KM.
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A Appendix
Table 7: Variance Decomposition of the KM model with At and 't stochastic
Variable From A (in %) From ' (in %)
Y 99.47 0.53
C 87.79 12.21
I 56.29 43.71
L 99.47 0.53
Y/L 99.47 0.53
w 99.47 0.53
r 99.71 0.29
q 3.94 96.06
p 0.99 99.01
Figures:
Figure 2a: Orthogonalized shock to At - Aggregates
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Figure 2b: Orthogonalized shock to At - Prices
Figure 3a: 1pp orthogonalized shock to 't. - Aggregates:
55
Figure 3b: 1pp orthogonalized shock to 't. - Prices
Figure 3c: 1pp orthogonalized transitory shock to 't. - Aggregates
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Figure 3d: 1pp orthogonalized transitory shock to 't. - Prices
Figure 4a: 1pp orthogonalized shock to t. - Aggregates
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Figure 5a: 1pp orthogonalized shock to . - Aggregates
Figure 5b: 1pp orthogonalized shock to  - Prices
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